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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of humanitarian intervention is not new. Coercive
intervention by a foreign power into the arguably internal affairs of
a sovereign state, for allegedly humanitarian reasons, has always been
controversial. Whether, or under what circumstances, such interven-
tion is permitted by international law has been widely disputed. If
there is any consensus, it is that such intervention should generally
be prohibited by international law, or should at least be narrowly
restricted by various substantive and procedural limitations.
This article will argue, however, that such a restrictive approach
to humanitarian intervention is no longer appropriate. It makes di-
minishing historical sense given the current and foreseeable practical
realities of world affairs. Historical trends demonstrate that the costs
of adhering to traditional restrictions on humanitarian intervention
are increasing, while the value of such restrictions is decreasing. For
several reasons, it seems probable that humanitarian intervention is
currently being undersupplied from the standpoint of overall collective
welfare. Loosening some of the traditional legal restrictions on
humanitarian intervention would likely lead to significant benefits,
with very limited risk of substantial additional costs. Substantial
change in the international law of humanitarian intervention is there-
fore appropriate.
*Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
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II. THE HISTORICAL DISTASTE FOR HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
Humanitarian intervention has been defined in various ways, as
has the broader concept of intervention itself. Intervention has been
defined as broad enough to include even the verbal remarks of govern-
ment actors concerning another state's affairs., On the other hand,
other writers have restricted the concept of intervention to include
only "dictatorial interference by a state in the internal affairs of
another state or in the relations between other states." 2 The narrower
scope of the latter definition makes it more likely that useful, reason-
ably accurate generalizations about intervention, or humanitarian in-
tervention, can be drawn. But such definitions may be excessively
narrow for some purposes. Some writers, for example, look to whether
the intervention in question was popularly welcomed3 or was invited
or sought by the government or the people affected as one criterion
of the moral justification of the intervention.4 Invited or welcomed
humanitarian intervention may still be appropriately classifiable as an
act of intervention even if it is not "dictatorial interference." 5
Defining intervention, or humanitarian intervention, in terms of
"dictatorial interference" raises the further issue of the normative
connotation of the definition itself. So defined, intervention is difficult
to justify and defend. The opposite problem arises when humanitarian
intervention is defined in terms such that moral endorsement is essen-
tially built into the concept itself. In Ellery Stowell's well-known
treatise,6 for example, humanitarian intervention is defined as "the
reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabit-
ants of another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persis-
tently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within which
the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice. '' 7
1. See, e.g., R. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 3
(1974); Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the At-
rocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547, 547 n. 1 (1987) (citing authority).
2. Wright, The Legality of Intervention Under the United Nations Charter, in 51 PROC.
AM. SOC. INT'L L. 79 (1958) (supplement).
3. See, e.g., Levitin, The Law of Force and the Force of Law: Grenada, the Falklands,
and Humanitarian Intervention, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 621, 654 (1986) ("if the people throw
flowers, the invasion is lawful, if they do not throw flowers, or if they throw anything else,
the invasion is unlawful").
4. See, e.g., Bond, A Survey of the Normative Rules of Intervention, 52 MIL. L. REV. 51,
62 (1971).
5. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6. E. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1921).
7. Id. at 53. See also Behuniak, The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by
Armed Force: A Survey, 79 MIL. L. REV. 157, 158 (1978) (quoting Stowell's definition); Graham,
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More recent attempts at defining humanitarian intervention have
also built some degree of favorable evaluation into the concept itself.8
Given the favorable connotation of the term "humanitarian," this may
to a degree be unavoidable. 9 But in light of the controversy, if not
widespread unpopularity, of actions that naturally seem to fall within
the scope of humanitarian intervention, we are best served by more
descriptively neutral definitions, as opposed to mostly normative ones.
Such an approach would allow writers an unimpaired opportunity to
intelligibly debate whether humanitarian intervention in general, or
particular acts thereof, are morally justified or morally permissible,
rather than whether an act that descriptively resembles humanitarian
intervention should fall outside the definition of humanitarian interven-
tion because the speaker believes it to be morally good or bad. Largely
descriptive, evaluatively neutral definitions of humanitarian interven-
tion are both possibleo and desirable.,, However, this article will not
be limited to any particular conception.
Historically humanitarian intervention has been a surprisingly un-
popular doctrine even when it has been neutrally defined and de-
scribed. This continues to be true today. Its moral soundness and
legality under principles of international law have been historically con-
troversial and even widely denied. 12 The contemporary status of the
doctrine is at best no more secure. In fact, Michael Akehurst has
suggested that "the United Nations debates on Cambodia in 1979
provide some evidence that there is now a consensus among states in
favor of treating humanitarian intervention as illegal. '' 13 Certainly, the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia might, in light of the appalling
Humanitarian Intervention in International Law as Related to the Practice of the United States,
22 MICH. L. REV. 312, 314 (1924) (quoting Stowell's definition).
8. See, e.g., F. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 5 (1988) (defining humanitarian
intervention as "the proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by
governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and who
themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government").
9. To some degree, however, the favorable connotation of "humanitarian" may be offset by
any presumed unjustifiability of "intervention" into the internal affairs of sovereign states.
10. See, e.g., R. VINCENT, supra note 1, at 13 (intervention as "that activity undertaken
by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organization which
interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state"). While "interferes" is negatively
connoted, the concept of coercion can be given a neutral, descriptive meaning. See, e.g., A.
WERTHEIMER, COERCION 188 (1987). But cf. Ryan, The Normative Concept of Coercion, 188
MIND 481, 483-84 (1980) (adopting a normatively-based definition).
11. But cf. Bazyler, supra note 1, at 547 n.1 ("there is little use in defining the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention").
12. See the authorities cited and discussed in E. STOWELL, supra note 6, at 58 & 58 n.12.
13. Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 95, 99
(H. Bull ed. 1984).
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character of the Pol Pot regime, have been characterized as raising
the issue of humanitarian intervention.14 However, in the course of
the United Nations debates, "[n]ot a single state spoke in favor of
the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention. '" 15 Such skepti-
cism concerning at least unilateral forcible humanitarian intervention
is also reflected among contemporary theorists. 16 Most of these
theorists, as this article proposes, would either proscribe or severely
restrict the exercise of humanitarian intervention.
Whatever its underlying moral status, humanitarian intervention
is widely thought to have been outlawed or severely restricted by the
United Nations Charter (Charter).' 7 The Charter, while preserving
the right of "individual or collective self-defense"18 against military
attack, provides that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."' 9 Whether or not
the latter provision still constitutes an effective, operative interna-
tional legal norm,- it is readily and popularly read by many commen-
tators2 as proscribing not merely aggressive, expansionist war, but
also most or all forms of humanitarian intervention.
For example:
Most authors interpret Article 2(4) as imposing a total
ban on the use of force in international relations except when
another provision of the Charter expressly recognizes or
creates an exception to that ban. This broad interpretation
of Article 2(4) is confirmed by the travaux preparatoires of
the Charter, and in recent years has received the support
of most of the member states of the United Nations.-
14. See generally, id.
15. Id. at 97.
16. See, e.g., Farer, Defending Human Rights in the Post-Reagan Era: Candor and Com-
petence, 28 VA. J. INrL L. 855, 860-61 (1988) (ruling out consideration of unilateral military
intervention for human rights purposes); Schacter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of
Force, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 291, 293 (1985) ("I would underline the importance of rejecting the
contention that force may be used unilaterally to achieve such laudable ends as freedom, self-rule
and human rights").
17. U.N. CHARTER.
18. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
19. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
20. See Rostow, The Legality of the International Use of Force by and from States, 10
YALE J. INT'L L. 286, 290 (1985) ("[a]t this moment .... it is impossible to determine whether
Article 2(4) of the Charter is an operative legal norm").
21. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 13.
22. Id. at 106 (citations omitted).
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Such an interpretation of the Charter has received scholarly support.2
It is not the only plausible interpretation,? however, and narrower
views of Article 2(4) have been advocated.?
Perhaps the most intriguing rationale for viewing at least some
coercive humanitarian intervention as consistent with the Charter,
however, relies on something loosely akin to the domestic contract
law doctrines of (1) frustration of purposew and (2) failure of condition
precedent.2 On this approach, the willingness of the Charter sig-
natories to forego unilateral humanitarian intervention was crucially
dependent upon the assumption that the United Nations would estab-
lish an effective collective security enforcement mechanism. The ab-
sence of such a mechanism works to excuse a breach of Article 2(4)
in the form of humanitarian intervention, at least in extreme cases.8
Such arguments turn partly on almost unresolvable issues of the con-
temporary intent of the ratifiers. However, in the absence of wide-
spread international endorsement of the principle of humanitarian in-
tervention, adopting the "condition precedent" approach seems ques-
tionable. One commentator observed that "[s]uch an argument . . .
could undermine the entire Charter. Nothing in the Charter suggests
that it is to be ignored if certain objectives are not satisfied. '"
Ultimately, the legal standing of the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention should not be expected to diverge far from its level Of popu-
larity in the international community, and the doctrine is not currently
popular. This might initially seem surprising, in view of the beneficial
23. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 2, at 88 ("military intervention by states is restricted by
the Charter to necessities of individual or collective self-defense, explicit treaty permissions or
requests, or United Nations authorizations"); Bazyler, supra note 1, at 548; Schacter, supra
note 16, at 294; Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human
Rights Norms in International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609, 619 n.41 ("Article 2(4)... outlaws
the use of force except in very limited situations").
24. See, e.g., Bond, supra note 4, at 66 (no bar if the intervention not aimed at "reforming
or replacing the government"); Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict,
9 VA. J. INTL L. 209, 262 (1969) (humanitarian intervention as not necessarily threatening
territorial integrity or political independence).
25. See the variety of less sweeping interpretations of article 2(4) canvassed in Lillich, A
United States Policy of Humanitarian Intervention and Intercession, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 278, 288-89 (D. Kommers & G. Loescher eds. 1979).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1979).
27. See id. § 225.
28. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 1, at 579-80; Behuniak, supra note 7, at 185-86; Reisman,
Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INTL L. 279, 279-80
(1985).
29. Hassan, Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict
"Humanitarian Intervention" Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 859, 890 (1981).
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aims of humanitarian intervention and the magnitude of moral deprav-
ity of which any number of twentieth century regimes have been
capable.
However, a number of considerations have conspired to minimize
the current standing of the doctrine. One consideration has been the
recognition by many states that, as a practical matter, they are more
likely to be subject to humanitarian intervention by one of the rela-
tively few states capable of global humanitarian intervention 3° than
they are to engage in humanitarian intervention themselves. There-
fore, it is in at least the narrow, selfish interest of such governments,
especially those engaging in substantial human rights abuses, to
characterize humanitarian intervention as a pretext designed to
legitimize invasion of the weak by the strong. Accordingly, some argue
that humanitarian intervention is "simply a cloak of legality for the
use of brute force by a powerful state against a weaker one,"'3 and
that "[e]xperience has shown how readily more powerful states have
used the pretext of a higher good to impose their will and values on
weaker states."32
Doubtless, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention carries the
risk of these and other-3 adverse consequences. Also, the risks and
cost of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention are enhanced in some
respects, rather than diminished, when one considers that humanita-
rian intervention can be undertaken by smaller states not ordinarily
classified among the world's major imperialist powers.- Even when
humanitarian intervention appears successful and avoids the danger
of promoting protracted guerrilla or conventional war, its costs may
be high. Western ethnocentrism, insensitivity to or ignorance of local
values, the unpredictability of subtle, undesired long-term conse-
quences and the undermining and disruption of national autonomy and
of fragile national institutions should give the potential intervenor
pause.
30. See R. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 85 (1981) ("only a few
powerful states are in a position to use their economic, cultural, and military power on behalf
of human rights").
31. Hassan, supra note 29, at 862.
32. Schacter, supra note 16, at 294.
33. Immanuel Kant, for example, argued in substance that humanitarian intervention jeopar-
dizes the autonomy of all states, and not merely the weak. See I. KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE
7 (L. Beck ed. 1957).
34. The intervention by Tanzania into Idi Amin's Uganda might well fall into the category




However, these considerations hardly suffice to show that the doc-
trine is so fatally subject to abuse that it should have no legitimate
role to play in international law and morality. Abolishing the doctrine
or even the practice of humanitarian intervention might not even sig-
nificantly reduce, let alone abolish, the adverse consequences thought
to be associated with humanitarian intervention. If the doctrine is a
mere pretext for imperialism, imperialism may readily find other suit-
able pretexts if deprived of this one. In addition, the "supply" of
humanitarian intervention is restricted not only by questionable assess-
ments by the intervenor of the cost imposed by the intervention on
the recipient state, but also by the intervening state's assessment,
post-Vietnam and post-Afghanistan, of the possible cost in blood, treas-
ure, and morale, to the intervening state itself. These costs, which
may be increasing, must be added to the potential cost to the inter-
venor in the broader international community if the intervention turns
out to be less than universally popular. Balanced against these costs,
from the self-interested standpoint of the potential intervenor, would
be the perhaps limited self-interested benefits likely to accrue from
the intervention, which may gradually be diminishing over time. From
a purely economic standpoint, as the value of individual life in the
most powerful states has increased along with per capita wealth, the
net economic value to the intervening state of the cruder sorts of
resource transfers associated with any activity characterized as
humanitarian intervention has been diminishing. Nations, it is widely
becoming recognized, do not achieve or maintain healthy economies
by pretextual seizures of the resources of the weak.-
These themes will be developed further below, but it is enough
for the moment to appreciate that at least at the present historical
juncture, humanitarian intervention, even with any and all necessarily
attendant evils, may well be "undersupplied" from any collectively
rational standpoint. While there may arguably be good grounds for
not morally condemning developing states,36 or for being skeptical of
rules of international law to which not all states are reciprocally vul-
nerable in any realistic sense, 37 none of the considerations against
35. See generally the illuminating essays in P. BAUER, REALTY AND RHETORIC: STUDIES
IN THE ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT (1984).
36. Cf. the "fundamental principle of the OAU never to condemn member states" referred
to in Hassan, supra note 29, at 873 n.79.
37. Not knowing the realistic likelihood of one's own state being subject to humanitarian
intervention by another state may help provide the best grounds for endorsing the morally
soundest approach to the issue of humanitarian intervention. See the rationale for the "veil of
ignorance" device developed in J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 13642 (1971).
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humanitarian intervention seem to rise to the status of moral absolutes.
At most, they counsel great caution. If we look solely to the short
and long term interests of the nation subject to humanitarian interven-
tion, it is implausible to suggest that successfully preventing or halting
the depredations of a government bent on the execution of a substantial
fraction of its own subjects can never be morally justified. At some
point, preventing mass carnage will outweigh the considerations
against humanitarian intervention, in part because considerations of
nation-building, the healthy growth of indigenous institutions, and
local autonomy begin to tell on the side of humanitarian intervention.
The extent to which humanitarian intervention should be legitimized
in less extreme circumstances will be considered below.
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is not merely subject to
criticism as an instrument of oppression of the weak by the strong,
but that the doctrine is more broadly open to abuse, manipulation,
rationalization, and overextension. One commentator has concluded
flatly that "humanitarian intervention is so blatantly open to spurious
claims that it should not be countenanced. ' 38 More colorfully, the doc-
trine allegedly lacks "a means that is both conceptually and instrumen-
tally credible to separate the few sheep of legitimate humanitarianism
from the herds of goats which can too easily slip through." 39
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is susceptible to abuse.
But the more decisive issue has been, at least as far back as the
debate on the point between Grotius4° and Vattel,41 that of the appro-
priate weight to be assigned to this susceptibility. On this score,
proponents of humanitarian intervention are not without response.
For example, even if "interventionary precedents once set are likely
to be extended to more dubious instances,"- the same may be said of
any well-justified legal rule or precedent. Freedom of political speech
in the United States has been extended to provide free speech protec-
tion for ordinary commercial nude dancing, 43 a "more dubious in-
38. Clark, Humanitarian Intervention: Help to Your Friends and State Practice, 13 GA.
J. INrL & Coup. L. 211, 213 (1983). See also Ball, Ironies of Intervention, 13 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 313, 314 ("a rule of non-intervention commends itself to us because the contrary
rule so readily falls prey to cynical manipulation").
39. Franck & Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Mili-
tary Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 284 (1973).
40. See H. GROTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 289 (M. Dunne ed. 1901) (reprinted
1979) ("right does not necessarily lose its character from being in the hands of wicked men").
41. E. VArTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 137 ( T. Johnson & J. Johnson eds. 1863) (reprinted
1982) ("[c]ould it escape Grotius ... that .. .his opinion opens a door to all the ravages of
enthusiasm and fanaticism, and furnishes ambition with numberless pretexts?").
42. R. FALK, supra note 30, at 168.
43. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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stance," but we do not reflexively abandon our concern for protecting
political speech in response. The value of the legitimate principle, as
well as the frequency and severity of its unavoidable abuse, must be
considered with some care.
More importantly, the focus should be not on the abuses perpe-
trated in the guise of humanitarian intervention, but on the potentially
less serious sum of abuses that occur only because of the available
pretext of humanitarian intervention. Other suitable pretexts may be
available such that if humanitarian intervention cannot be used as a
cover, the iniquitous abuse will occur anyway under the guise of some
other equally suitable doctrine. It may be true, for example, that
Hitler happened to seize upon the doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion in what was an utterly unconvincing- attempt to justify his annex-
ation of Czechoslovakia and his invasion of Poland. 45 The critical ques-
tion is, however, whether Hitler would have been deterred from
engaging in these depredations had the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention been unavailable for some reason. A sense of realism prompts
us to recognize that if the pretext of humanitarian intervention had
been unavailable, Hitler simply would have seized upon some other
equally implausible doctrine, such as self-defense or the protection of
German nationals in foreign states. The harm, in a word, would have
occurred anyway, with or without the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention.
Even more fundamentally, the rise of contemporary moral re-
lativism" has contributed to undermining the moral appeal of the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Relativism in the moral realm
may eventually lead to relativism in international law. This process
has reached the point at which "[i]nternational law seems unable to
distinguish, on a principled basis, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
from the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda, let alone the United States'
invasion of Grenada.N7
It is often difficult to know enough about the subtle cultural strands
binding a foreign society together to have confidence in our inclination
44. See Bond, supra note 4, at 74.
45. See id.; Bazyler, supra note 1, at 584.
46. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 765 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[rielativistic
notions of rights and wrong . . . have achieved in recent times a disturbingly high level of
prominence in this country .... ").
47. Levitin, supra note 3, at 622. Quincy Wright has written more broadly that "[interna-
tional law cannot protect the new states of Asia and Africa from subversive intervention by
Communist states without protecting the Communist states of Eastern Europe from subversive
intervention by democratic states of the West." Wright, supra note 2, at 531.
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to violate its territorial integrity or political sovereignty.8 But to
succumb to either cultural agnosticism or moral relativism to the ex-
tent necessary to undermine the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
is to fall into an error no less serious than that of cultural arrogance,
ethnocentrism, or the uncritical projection of our own values into other
cultures. A tribe, for example, that is fleeing its home territory in
apparent stark terror may in fact be suffering persecution in a recog-
nizable way, rather than merely participating in some profound cultural
ritual too ineffable for the potential intervenor to grasp.
It has been said that "[t]here is something very different about
ending the Prague Spring and ending the reign of Idi Amin.149 Such
a view is persuasive to many, despite the rise of moral relativism and
the need for modesty in presuming to understand and influence foreign
cultures. What leads us to act upon such views, despite the distinct
possibility that such humanitarian intervention is not permissible under
positive international law, is the related sense that when the dictates
of morality conflict with those of international law, it is the dictates
of morality that must control. 5o
Ironically, there is a sense in which moral and cultural relativism
may actually pave the way for humanitarian intervention. The argu-
ment may be made that a potential intervenor should respect the
popular institutional choice of a foreign people, however depraved or
barbaric that choice may appear to some outsiders. This argument
may itself depend upon some non-relativist premise which may conflict
with other non-relativist moral principles. But equally importantly,
why is the would-be intervenor morally required to defer to the value
choices of the potentially intervened-upon state? It may be said that
mass killings are right for some societies, if wrong for others. It is
not clear, however, why the intervening state might not equally de-
mand the world's respect for its choice to intervene. Perhaps interven-
ing in the largely internal affairs of other states is right for some
states, if not for others. There may well be some relevant moral
difference between what a society does internally, to itself, and what
it does to unconsenting foreign states. Such a difference, however,
takes on effective moral weight only when seen as a non-relativist
moral consideration, and as only one such consideration among others.
48. See Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 209, 212 (1980).
49. Levitin, supra note 3, at 622.
50. Cf. K. BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW vii (1965) (moral rightness of an act as
providing a conclusive reason for doing it).
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III. THE MORAL AND PRACTICAL BASES FOR AN EXPANDED
DOCTRINE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A broad, permissive principle of humanitarian intervention need
not be based upon some narrow, controversial set of ethical principles.
Humanitarian intervention, in forms as mild as noncoercive mul-
tilateralism 51 or as extreme as political assassinationr2 may be morally
justified under a variety of theories. Humanitarian intervention gen-
erally might be justified on any of a variety of human rights-based
approaches.A Appeals to the natural law tradition may- or may not5
be considered useful in this context. And while some will repudiate a
narrowly utilitarian- approach to humanitarian intervention, 57 there
is some potential force to even a purely utilitarian justification of some
acts of humanitarian intervention. Suppose it could be reasonably
known that a particularly bloodthirsty tyrant, ruling mainly by fear,
intimidation, and mutual suspicion, and without any significant popular
support, determined arbitrarily to torture and kill the nation's middle
class. 58 A utilitarian approach to humanitarian intervention might take
into account the subtle, indirect, long-term nation-building or cultural
costs of intervention, to the extent reasonably knowable, as well as
the likelihood of a less barbaric successor. But if no less distasteful
means were available, even political assassination, under some moral
theories, might seem permissible, if not required, even if this were
51. See, e.g., J. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10-11 (1987).
52. See, e.g., Note, The Legality of Assassination as an Aspect of Foreign Policy, 27 VA.
J. INT'L L. 655, 676-77 (1987) ("[tlhe legality of assassination as a form of humanitarian inter-
vention under the framework set forth by scholars . . . seems doubtful").
53. See L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 108-09 (1978); J. NICKEL, supra note
51, at 10-11; Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions, 1967 WIs.
L. REV. 171; De Schutter, Humanitarian Intervention: A United Nations Task, 3 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 21, 27 (1972).
54. See Reisman, Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, 78
PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 74, 79-80 (1986).
55. See Watson, supra note 23, at 613 ("reliance on natural law ... is not a particularly
persuasive position to argue from, due to the general disrepute into which natural law has
fallen"). But cf. George, Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371
(1988) (explicating and, to a substantial degree, defending the contemporary natural law ap-
proaches of Germain Grisez and John Finnis).
56. For an extended analytical treatment of the utilitarian tradition generally, see, e.g., D.
LYONS, THE FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965).
57. See, e.g., F. TESON, supra note 8, at 116 ("[t]he moral imperative to fight evil sometimes
overrides calculations in terms of death and sufferings").
58. For a sense of some of the moral issues involved in killing one person in order to save
numerous others under various moral circumstances, see, e.g., Thomson, The Trolley Problem,
in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 94 (W. Parent ed. 1986).
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thought to tarnish the intervenor's image, or to license more indiscrimi-
nate further assassination or terrorism.
Humanitarian intervention is therefore not tied to any particular
sort of moral foundation. That it is not frequently undertaken hardly
establishes that it is generally indefensible on any widely accepted
moral scheme. From an economic perspective, humanitarian interven-
tion may well qualify as a "public good" that is systematically supplied
in suboptimal amounts.5 9 Intervening states often cannot charge their
beneficiaries, the offending government, or the international commu-
nity, a price remotely resembling the net benefit conferred by the
intervention. Many states and groups who would gain substantially
by the intervention of any of a number of parties would be tempted
to seek "free-rider" status.- That humanitarian intervention, even of
enormous net benefit, is not frequently supplied may therefore reflect
not the shakiness of its moral foundations, but the imperfection of the
market for humanitarian intervention.
Some concede that there may not only be a right, but a duty, to"rescue" human lives if one can do so at a not disproportionate cost,6 1
regardless of the intervenor's inability to collect a reward for the act
of intervention. However, even those who subscribe to such a view
may fail to perform rescues, or to engage in appropriate acts of
humanitarian intervention, for reasons that do not impugn the moral
right or obligation to do so. States and peoples were made vividly
aware by television of the nature and scale of the depredations perpe-
trated by Uganda's Idi Amin,6 as they are of other plausible can-
didacies for humanitarian intervention. Doubtless there may be mor-
ally cogent reasons for delaying intervention, or for not intervening
59. For the general theory, see R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17-20 (1982); M. OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (rev. ed. 1971). A brief definition, serviceable for present
purposes, holds that "[a] pure public good is a good such that when it is supplied to any party
it cannot be withheld from supply to any other party, and/or such that supply to one party does
not diminish supply to any other party." B. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULA-
TION 171 n.21 (1980).
60. See B. MITNICK, supra note 59, at 111.
61. Cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973) (requiring reasonable assistance to the gravely
physically imperiled where no danger to the rescuer or interference with other important obli-
gation is involved). For a philosophical treatment in the realm of charity, rather than humanita-
rian intervention, see Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND
SOCIETY 33 (P. Laslet & J. Fishkin eds. fifth series 1979) ("we ought to give until we reach
the level . . . at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my
dependents as I would relieve by my gift").
62. See Ullman, Introduction: Human Rights - Toward International Action, in ENHANC-
ING GLOBAL ECONOMIC RIGHTS 1, 4 (J. Dominquez, N. Rodley, B. Wood & R. Falk eds. 1979).
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at all in such cases. But a belated intervention, or failure to intervene
at all, may also be attributable to social and psychological dynamics
of no substantial moral weight.
There may, for example, be international analogues of the well-
known incident involving the attack on Kitty Genovese:
Consider the thirty plus citizens of Kew Gardens in New
York City who, some years ago, stood mute, in the safety
of their homes, as one of their neighbors, Kitty Genovese,
screamed for help as she was being stabbed to death. No
one rushed heroically to her aid. No one shouted an alarm.
No one even telephoned the police.6
In at least some loose, less extreme sense, such an incident is paralleled
in the international context when a number of states intervene either
belatedly or not at all under circumstances fairly calling for humanita-
rian intervention. The problem is in part that a number of potential
intervenors exist and are aware not only of the plight of the victims,
but also of the presence of other potential intervenors. There is some
experimental grounds to suspect that increasing the number of poten-
tial intervening states, all of whom are known as potential intervenors,
actually tends to reduce the probability of a timely rescue. For exam-
ple, psychologists Latan6 and Darley, as a result of their well-known
studies, concluded that at the level of individuals, as opposed to na-
tions, the presence of multiple potential intervenors tended to slow
or discourage rescues through a process of diffusion of responsibility.
A diffusion of responsibility model makes the greatest sense when
dealing with a collection of strangers rather than organized rescue
squads. But if the international community is not precisely a collection
of strangers, neither are states presently organized by treaties into
rescue squads with assigned responsibilities under particular con-
tingencies. To the extent that something like the diffusion of respon-
sibility model helps account for the infrequency of humanitarian inter-
vention, we have one more reason for suspecting that the incidence
of humanitarian intervention may be suboptimal from the standpoint
of collective welfare.
In part, the opposition to liberalized rules of humanitarian interven-
tion is based on the lessons of history. While we may in a sense
deplore the fact that "[t]he world tends to stand by as governments
63. H. HORNSTEIN, CRUELTY AND KINDNESS 3 (1976).
64. See generally Latand & Darley, Social Determinants of Bystander Intervention in
Emergencies, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR 13-27 (J. Macauley & L. Berkowitz eds.
1970).
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slaughter the political opposition, native populations on desirable land,
or racial minorities," we may suppose that the lessons of history in
fact counsel such passivity. There is certainly at least some grounds
to believe that "[t]he historical record of so-called humanitarian inter-
vention bears out [a] skeptical response to those governments who
currently proclaim themselves the global guardians of human rights. "-
Such historically-based arguments are difficult to dismiss with any
confidence. How a dispassionate but benevolent analyst would go about
authoritatively striking the balance between the assumed net negative
consequences for colonial African human rights attributable to Britain's
past interventions, as against an earlier intervention against Pol Pot,
Idi Amin, or even Hitler, is unclear. This article does not presume
to address the monumentally complex task of calculating the costs and
benefits of the humanitarian intervention doctrine in the past.
Somewhat more manageable, if still speculative, is the task of
determining whether contemporary historical trends suggest that a
liberalized doctrine of humanitarian intervention is justifiable. It may
well be that even if the doctrine was not worth its cost in the past,
it may be worth it today, as historical and economic circumstances
change. Fear of widespread serious abuse of the humanitarian inter-
vention doctrine may well be less justified in light of reasonably clear,
stable, long term trends.
One such stable, long term trend is that of the sheer economic
value of a human life. In some sense, an individual human life possesses
a dignity not susceptible to measure in terms of price. Doubtless the
problem of poverty even in absolute terms persists. But at least for
Western and many other societies generally, there has been "an im-
mense increase in the material well-being of virtually all strata 67 over
the period from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present.
There are two preeminent implications that flow from this estab-
lished trend. First, there is less practical point to legal restrictions
on humanitarian intervention, because potential intervenors realize
that their own risks, or potential costs, in human lives, from an unsuc-
cessful or a messy or extended intervention are greater today than
formerly. The average intervenor, as a nation or as an individual,
simply has more to lose by death or destruction than formerly. To
some extent this is offset by the increasing ease with which a given
65. Watson, The Limited Utility of International Law in the Protection of Human Rights,
74 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1980).
66. R. FALK, supra note 30, at 2.
67. P. BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 41 (1986)..
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instrument of military intervention or automated weaponry can be
purchased. Instead, the primary effect seems to be in the direction
of increased recognition that modern societies are increasingly ac-
cumulating an immense amount of hard-earned per capita economic
value, and that each individual's life is of increasing value in an
economic sense.6 Some or all of this unprecedented wealth is jeopar-
dized by humanitarian intervention, as all societies increasingly ap-
preciate.
Second, restrictive approaches to humanitarian intervention be-
come less justifiable when the beneficiaries of prospective humanita-
rian intervention may now tend to have much more to gain from such
intervention than formerly. Someone who was helped by military in-
tervention to leave the precursor of Vietnam or Kampuchea 100 years
ago might have successfully avoided an undesirable fate, but the prob-
able sheer economic value of their life elsewhere may not have been
substantially higher. Today, someone who escapes the Pol Pot regime
and settles in the United States, or elsewhere, may not only save his
or her life, but stupendously increase their economic prospects in
absolute and relative terms.
It is also important to recognize the world's increasing appreciation
of the fact that the route to substantial national wealth is decreasing,
if at all, through bogus claims of humanitarian intervention. It may
once have been plausible to suppose that the optimal path to national
wealth was through the expedient of stealing or extorting the wealth
of another state under the pretext of humanitarian intervention. Such
a technique, however, is increasingly seen as at best outdated. The
obvious positive models - Japan and West Germany after World War
II, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and others69 -
hardly stand as testimonials to the efficacy of colonialist land-grabs
as the royal road to substantially increased wealth. Particularly for
the larger powers, the overall cost-benefit ratio of attempting to seize
control of material resources under the pretext of humanitarian inter-
vention is clearly increasing.7° The sine qua non of national wealth
today is not a matter of physical resources, but of voluntarily mobilized
and developed human capital.
68. This recognition may help in some measure to account for the unwillingness of both
the United States and the Soviet Union to respond to military frustrations in Vietnam and
Afghanistan respectively by military means within their technical capabiliies.
69. See P. BERGER, supra note 67, at 11.
70. It should be noted that this trend does not depend upon any assumption of relatively
good or improving relations between and among the superpowers.
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A final historical consideration, perhaps more controversial, is that
despite the undeniable inexactness of the social sciences, the world
knows more than it did 50 years ago about the merits of particular
substantive theories of humanitarian intervention. Fifty years ago,
humanitarian intervention, to help place a recognizably Marxist-
Leninist government in power on the assumption that this strategy
of coercive central economic direction would promote rapid economic
growth and respect of human rights, may have had some particular
degree of plausibility. Today, the plausibility of such a strategy has
decreased. There is doubtless still some ambivalence about this,71 and
it is clear that a private market economy is no guarantee of either
economic success or respect for basic human rights. 72 But the cumula-
tive evidence, including for example the recent experience of Colonel
Mengistu's collectivization of Ethiopia,7 and the post-World War II
experience74 has generally undermined the plausibility of any associa-
tion between genuine humanitarian intervention and externally as-
sisted Marxist-Leninist revolution.
Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union has, within the
limits of its perhaps overstrained capacities, perpetrated a number of
excesses partially in the name of humanitarian intervention, including
the invasion of Afghanistan. Of course, "[a]ny government willing to
believe that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constituted humanita-
rian intervention would support the Soviets whatever the content of
international law."' It seems fair to suggest, however, that even a
substantial liberalization of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
would not lead to a significant increase in Soviet abuses. This may
partly be due not only to increasing resource constraints and any
change in the Soviet world-view, but also to the availability of other
minimally distinct purported justifications for external adventures,
such as the Brezhnev doctrine,7- wars of national liberation, 77 mutual
71. See R. FALK, supra note 30, at 7 (recognizing 'the disappointing record of socialist
states with respect to safeguarding the political, civil, and cultural rights of their citizens," but
concluding that "a humanistic socialism seems to be the best hope for the future for the over-
whelming majority of societies in the world").
72. See generally the thoughtful analysis of Peter Berger in P. BERGER, PYRAMIDS OF
SACRIFICE (1974).
73. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 558 (noting the historical ability of Ethiopian farmers to
at least prevent famine prior to Mengistu's collectivization of agriculture).
74. See, e.g., P. BAUER, supra note 35, at 19-37; P. BERGER, supra note 67, at 37; M.
NovAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 106 (1982).
75. Levitin, supra note 3, at 655.
76. See Moore, Legal Standards for Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 191, 197 (1983) (discussing the Brezhnev Doctrine).
77. See, e.g., R. VINCENT, supra note 1, at 374; Bilder, supra note 53, at 201.
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defense obligations, 78 and the presumed categorical superiority of the
socialist system. 79 Consistent reliance on alternative justifications
would also entail the advantage, from the Soviet standpoint, of allow-
ing the Soviet Union to decry humanitarian intervention by other
states as objectionable interference in the internal affairs of sovereign
states.80
IV. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN EXPANDED DOCTRINE
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
It is no doubt difficult to pronounce authoritatively on the net
consequences for the world if well-intended humanitarian intervention
were to become more common. The notion may strike some as poten-
tially destabilizing and therefore troubling. But it is useful to recall
that this article argues not necessarily for substantially expanded ac-
tual, or more frequent, use of humanitarian intervention. Rather, this
article argues for expanding or liberalizing the legitimate availability
of the doctrine under international law, so that potential intervenors
are not unreasonably discouraged by considerations of international
law or the international condemnation stemming from the intervenor's
arguable violation of international law. 81
Even the most successful, richly justified humanitarian intervention
imposes costs in the form of stress from adapting to significant rapid
change within the targeted society, however beneficial.82 Beyond this,
coercive humanitarian intervention may, however well justified, en-
courage or tend to legitimize coercive approaches to international dis-
putes in general, even where unjustified.8o In fact, precisely the most
surgically successful interventions, with least cost to the intervenor,
may have the greatest such demonstration effect. 4
78. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 1, at 585-86.
79. See, e.g., R. VINCENT, upra note 1, at 11; Franck & Rodley, supra note 39, at 288;
Moore, supra note 76, at 197.
80. See Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 AM. J. INTL L. 521, 522 & 522 n.3 (1960).
81. A certain measure of hypocrisy may circulate around such international condemnation.
Imagine the circumstance of the destruction, by a third party not directly threatened, of the
nearly complete atomic weapons production facilities of two fanatical, implacably hostile states.
Such an intervention would doubtless draw, simultaneously, nearly universal official condemna-
tion, and nearly universal heartfelt gratitude and relief not officially expressed.
82. See generally, P. MARRIS, Loss AND CHANGE (1975).
83. See Franck & Rodley, upra note 39, at 299 n. 105. For the role of modeling and
desensitization generally in social behavior, see generally A. BANDURA & R. WALTERS, SOCIAL
LEARNING AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1963).
84. If so, this might tend to constrain the overall net cost of all purported humanitarian
interventions, justified and unjustified, combined.
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Other potential costs of intervention, as discussed in section II
above, may take various forms. Externally imposing even a morally
justified policy on a determined minority of the local citizenry may be
surprisingly costly.15 It is important to recognize that most of this
cost will be directly borne by the prospective intervenor itself, who
is likely to appreciate, especially after Vietnam and Afghanistan, the
need to expect unexpected costs in intervening. The cost of protracted
intervention, perhaps involving territorial administrations6 in cases
where sabotage of that administration by opponents may be relatively
inexpensive, will be obvious to potential intervenors. Appreciation of
the potential cost makes international legal restrictions on humani-
tarian intervention less necessary.
There is no guarantee, however, that even carefully planned
humanitarian intervention will not backfire, or even inspire a negative
reaction within the targeted society.8 7 Such an intervention may simply
amount to one more episode in a persistent failure of the particular
indigenous regime to attain either stability or legitimacy. 8 The very
circumstances of the intervention, however, may limit the potential
cost of instability, nation-building, and disorganization. For example,
Ethiopia has been among the prime candidates for humanitarian inter-
vention over the past few years. It has been said that "Ethiopia now
has the dubious distinction of having both the worst human rights
record in the world . . . and the lowest per capita gross national
product . . . ." This conjunction may not be entirely fortuitous. One
implication is that as long as the human rights-motivated intervenor
into Ethiopia is reasonably effective in promoting the production and
distribution of food and health care, the net effects of the intervention
are likely to be positive, regardless of its political success or failure,
or any unexpected consequences generated in other respects. 90
85. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 53, at 202.
86. See Graham, supra note 7, at 326.
87. See Watson, supra note 23, at 630.
88. See M. NOVAK, supra note 74, at 294.
89. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 612 n.312 (citations omitted).
90. It is technically possible that Colonel Mengistu's successor might turn out to be worse,
from both the human rights and economic standpoint, given sufficient bad luck, societal passivity,
and so forth. But one must choose either to intervene or not intervene, and assuming Mengistu's
superiority to his probable successor, given the low baseline, not to intervene may not seem
the morally responsible choice. If the successor does in fact turn out to somehow be worse,
there will still be a case of some strength for humanitarian intervention against that regime.
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The sheer disapproval by other states of one's intervention certainly
counts as a very real cost of intervening. 91 It may be that great,
unnecessary evil has been perpetuated merely because a would-be
intervenor reasonably feared the diplomatic consequences of interven-
tion. The problem is that the force of international condemnation of
intervention remains, whether such condemnation is justified or not.
Domestically, many criminals no doubt object vehemently to being
imprisoned, but we do not ordinarily require that criminal prosecutions
be widely popular, perhaps even among those prosecuted. Broadening
the legitimate scope of humanitarian intervention, if undertaken as a
matter of a consensual change in international law, would therefore
by itself reduce one of the significant costs of humanitarian interven-
tion, namely that of the sheer magnitude of the international diplomatic
pillorying undergone by the intervenor.
It is often argued that humanitarian intervention of a military sort
is inherently self-defeating. It has been colorfully suggested that "guns
do not have . . . the gift of diminishing the number of corpses or of
disinfecting the atmosphere corrupted by their smoke. '"- This, how-
ever, is either equally true of ordinary domestic police activities, or
is quite possibly false. There is some reason to suppose that the fre-
quency of human rights violations may bear some relation to the prob-
ability and severity of the sanctions imposed on such rights violations.93
A broader theory of justified humanitarian intervention, to the extent
that it tends to enhance either the probability or the severity of sanc-
tions imposed on inhumane governments, may well reduce the inci-
dence of human rights violations through a classic deterrence effect.94
Increased deterrence, however, cannot be guaranteed as the inevit-
able result of a broader legitimization of humanitarian intervention.
One writer has suggested that reservation by some states of a right
to humanitarian intervention "may make other states reluctant to ac-
cept legal obligations concerning human rights." 95 Such a reaction can
hardly be ruled out. What is doubtful, however, is its moral and
practical significance. What civilized society cares about preeminently
91. See L. HENKIN, supra note 53, at 110 (human rights-based intervention commonly
seen as officious meddling).
92. TANOVICEANE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE L'INTERVENTION 12-13 (1884), quoted in
Hassan, supra note 29, at 883.
93. See Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: The View from Charlottesville, in HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 149, 155 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
94. For a discussion of the domestic criminal deterrence analogy, see J. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME 195-97 (1977).
95. Akehurst, supra note 13, at 111.
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is not whether a government accepts particular legal standards with
respect to human rights, but how that government in fact behaves
with respect to human rights. We care more about deterring egregious
human rights violations than about inducing potential violators to adopt
formally the relevant legal norms. What is morally objectionable about
a Pol Pot or a Colonel Mengistu is what they do substantively. Catching
a Pol Pot or a Mengistu in an alleged violation of their own interna-
tional legal promise to adhere to certain minimal civil rights standards
seems morally inconsequential and may in fact be disastrous if the
price to be paid is our foreswearing the possibility of humanitarian
intervention.
A final general concern is whether a liberalized international law
of humanitarian intervention might not unfortunately tend to under-
mine the domestic order and authority structure of the state subject
to intervention in ways that might jeopardize the attainment of any
sort of just social order within that society.9 Relatedly, one might
fear that a broader principle of humanitarian intervention might tend
to undermine the necessary order not so much within the target state,
as in the general international community. Allowing the use of force
for humanitarian intervention might tend to disinhibit restraints on
the use of military force for other far less legitimate purposes.9
Such arguments, however, carry great moral weight in only narrow
contexts. A large group that is being systematically massacred may
strongly prefer even temporary anarchy, or a reversion to regional
or tribal government, to annihilation. Also, we do not normally fear
that ordinary domestic police activity simply makes matters worse by
somehow serving to legitimize the application of violence for criminal
purposes. Instead, it seems entirely possible that humanitarian inter-
vention sends signals that are on balance conducive to achieving a
just international order. Humanitarian military intervention, it may
plausibly be argued, may tend to call attention to and promote respect
for some of the basic moral values sought to be served by the inter-
national and domestic legal order itself.
This might tend to occur even in cases in which the humanitarian
intervention falls outside the scope of an unduly narrow, constricted
set of international legal justifications. One might consider the domes-
tic law analogue of civil disobedience in which a legally racially segre-
gated lunch counter is forcibly or coercively integrated by conscienti-
ous9 black protesters, who are then peaceably arrested, tried, and
96. See R. VINCENT, supra note 1, at 346.
97. See Behuniak, supra note 7, at 182.
98. See C. COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 131 (1971) (civil disobedience as "more often a
manifestation of respect for law than of contempt for it").
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convicted. It is hardly self-evident that the campaign of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. did more to undermine than to ultimately strengthen
the rule of law. Just as the enforcement of unjust laws may engender
disrespect for the system of laws, 99 so even coercive humanitarian
intervention may, in appropriate instances, contribute to the sense of
the basic equitableness of the system of laws in such a way as to
strengthen the system of laws on balance.
V. PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON THE DOCTRINE OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Even among those at least modestly sympathetic to the idea of
humanitarian intervention, it is typically supposed that the interna-
tional legal permissibility of humanitarian intervention should be se-
verely narrowed by means of a variety of restrictions. Among such
possible restrictions would be that the intervenor first have exhausted
other peaceful means before intervening with force.1°° Other such re-
strictions of the doctrine would include a requirement of mul-
tilateralism,1°1 of invitation by the subject state or people,- ° of disin-
terested motives on the part of the intervenor,0 3 or that the interven-
tion seek to redress serious, severe, widespread, and perhaps immi-
nent abuses.104 Legal restrictions of this sort seem sensible and pru-
dent. As it turns out, however, they are generally either practically
unnecessary, or seriously questionable at the level of moral principle.
Consider first the proposed requirement that the prospective inter-
venor exhaust less intrusive remedies before resorting to humanitarian
intervention, particularly where such intervention would involve mili-
tary action. In particular circumstances, the legitimate goals of the
prospective intervenor might be fulfilled by lesser means, such as
unilateral or multilateral private or public diplomacy, verbal expres-
sions of support for oppressed groups, or economic and political sanc-
tions of varying degrees of severity aimed at the offending state.105
Exhaustion of lesser remedies is typically thought of, however, as
only a general requirement. Realistically, "[t]here may be instances
99. See id. at 154.
100. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 1, at 606.
101. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 24, at 264.
102. See, e.g., Bond, supra note 4, at 62.
103. See, e.g., De Schutter, supra note 53, at 29, 36.
104. See, e.g., F. TESON, supra note 8, at 117, Fonteyne, The Custmnary International
Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 260 (1974); Levitin, supra note 3, at 652-53.
105. See Lillich, supra note 25, at 279.
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where resort to other alternatives may be futile or where it may even
compound the tragedy."1°6 Under appropriate circumstances, there-
fore, the requirement of exhaustion of lesser potential remedies may
be waived, 107 in loose analogy to the logic of sometimes waiving a
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies in the domestic
legal context. 108
Generally, there seems little practical point to an international
legal requirement of exhaustion in this context. Most circumstances
involving prospective humanitarian intervention will be such that the
state considering military intervention will have the strongest domestic
political, economic, and diplomatic incentives to effectuate their aims
through means less intrusive than military intervention. Except to
the extent that the intervenor's motive is, for example, an imperialist
land or resource seizure, or to destroy a threatening army, or some
other extrinsic motive, a state contemplating risking battlefield casual-
ties and the costs of war would be exceptionally irrational to ignore
much less costly or risky alternative means of achieving its aims.
The law in this respect would merely mandate what an even minimally
rational self-interested state would do anyway. Balanced against this
limited gain from an exhaustion requirement would be the risk that
complance would, in actual practice, sometimes produce a morally
unjustifiable delay, as states coped with the uncertainty of applying
the exhaustion requirement by creating a diplomatic record of their
formal exploration of alternatives to military intervention, merely for
purposes of compliance with international law. A state may know that
no less intrusive alternatives are practically available while also know-
ing that weeks would be required to create a contemporary documen-
tary record showing this fact. If the state intervenes without establish-
ing the record in advance, it may never be able to do so after the
intervention, when unsympathetic actors are free to announce that
they would have fully cooperated with or approved of non-military
alternatives.
106. Bazyler, supra note 1, at 606.
107. See Behuniak, supra note 7, at 188; Fonteyne, supra note 104, at 264 (failure to
exhaust excusable if the violations sought to be redressed by intervention are imminent). But
cf. De Schutter, supra note 53, at 30 (prohibiting the use of force unless there is "positive proof
that all available and reasonably effective means have been exhausted ... without fair indication
of impending successful results" and unless it is "certain" that peaceful means will be unavailing).
108. For a brief discussion of circumstances constituting exceptions to, or excusing failure
to fulfil, the general exhaustion requirement, see, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 8.31, at 504-07 (2d ed. 1984) (not including civil right-based exceptions).
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The cost of a requirement that humanitarian intervention be mul-
tilateral or under the aegis of some appropriate international organi-
zation is even greater. Those who advocate a multi-lateralism require-
ment typically assume that such a restriction will reduce the incidence
of self-interested abuse of the doctrine.'°9 This concern leads back to
the question, explored above, 110 of whether the cost of abuse stemming
from broadening the legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention is
likely to outweight the benefits. However, the multilateralism require-
ment in particular seems to be ill-suited to the task of encouraging
appropriate intervention and discouraging inappropriate intervention.
As it has developed, the most effective international organizational
support for human rights has tended to develop in those regions of
the world least needful of humanitarian intervention.' In theory, it
is possible to have recourse to the United Nations for humanitarian
intervention where regional organizations are weak, but the record of
the United Nations is suspect from a moral standpoint. As one com-
mentator has observed:
It took three years to get the human rights abuses of the
Khmer Rouge on the United Nations agenda. Even after
United Nations experts concluded that genocide was occur-
ring in Kampuchea, the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mission continued to postpone the matter. To this day, the
United Nations has not considered or condemned the human
rights violations of the Khmer Rouge .... 112
There is thus a serious risk that any sort of multilateralism require-
ment will lead to a morally unsatisfactory frequency of laws on
humanitarian intervention.
A multilateralism requirement might be defended on other grounds,
however. Those who attribute great importance to building and en-
hancing the role of collective international organizations in order to
supplement or partially replace the current system of sovereign
states,1 3 may strongly prefer collective or United Nations-sponsored
humanitarian intervention." 4 From such a standpoint, it may seem
worth sacrificing some present lives for the sake of hastening the
arrival of a new international order.
109. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 24, at 264.
110. See Sections II & III.
111. See L. HENKIN, supra note 53, at 104.
112. Bazyler, supra note 1, at 553.
113. See, e.g., R. FALK, supra note 30, at 7.
114. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 1, at 602.
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Several points might be made in response. First, it is not clear
that an expanded doctrine of humanitarian intervention actually re-
tards, rather than furthers, the cause of a new international order
transcending individual sovereign states. To expand the scope for in-
tervening in what might otherwise be referred to as the internal affairs
of sovereign states is to expand the occasions on which individual state
sovereignty may legally be subordinated to other, morally-based con-
siderations. Second, it seems speculative at best, and morally utopian
at worst, to risk the sacrifice of large numbers of lives for the sake
of only some minimal contribution to long term international organiza-
tional change that is itself vague, 115 perhaps unattainable,116 and is
currently no more popular than is an expanded doctrine of humanita-
rian intervention. 117
It would therefore seem at best not clearly advantageous to adopt
a multilateralism requirement for humanitarian intervention. One al-
ternative way of restricting the doctrine would be to adopt one form
or another of an invitation requirement. But while an invitation re-
quirement, intended to prevent abuses," 8 may seem sensible, it again
turns out to be either practically of little value, or positively harmful.
There is some uncertainty as to who is to invite the intervention.
Among the candidates would be the recognized government of the
state targeted for intervention," 9 "the people" of the targeted state, 2°
or the actual victims of the persecution against which intervention is
contemplated. 121 Each of these very different formulations poses differ-
ent issues. Waiting for an invitation by a despotic government to
intervene against that government's own despotism of course eviscer-
ates the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Invitations by "the
people" generally will often be difficult to recognize. How do we ascer-
tain the authentic voice of the majority apart from the voice of its
government? Even if we knew independently the will of the majority,
what is to be done when, as is commonly the case, the human rights
or other moral abuses are being practiced against only a minority, or
a particular class or ethnic group, with the acquiescence of the major-
ity? This leaves the possibility of requiring only an invitation by the
115. See Watson, supra note 23, at 639.
116. See id.
117. See R. FALK, supra note 30, at 33 ("[in most respects national sovereignty at the
state level is stronger than ever").
118. See Bond, supra note 4, at 62.
119. See Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGILL L.J. 205, 218 (1969).
120. See Levitin, supra note 3, at 654.
121. See F. TESON, supra note 8, at 119.
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victims themselves. While this sort of invitation may seem more read-
ily obtainable, problems of identifying authentic victim spokespersons
and of genuine and important disagreements within the victim commu-
nity remain. There is also the possibility that the victims themselves
have been terrorized or brainwashed into not desiring intervention as
well.,- If so, the intervention may, with no indigenous support, be
unpromising as a practical matter anyway.
Realistically, it should nearly always be possible to obtain an invi-
tation from someone to intervene, if not from the government itself.
This would seem to be the lesson not only of Prague in 1968, but also
of the alleged invitation by Austria in 1938 to be invaded by Hitler
and incorporated into the German Reich. 1- If in fact an invitation of
some sort, however procured, will virtually always be available, the
invitation requirement would seem in its weaker version to be of little
practical value, and in its more rigorous formulations to eviscerate
the doctrine of morally justified humanitarian intervention.
A further alternative restriction would require that the interven-
tion be conducted with some appropriate sort of motive on the part
of the intervening state. The central focus of such a requirement is a
state of mind of disinterestedness or altruism on the part of the would-
be intervenor. The rigor of this requirement varies among its propo-
nents. The formulation may take the relatively demanding form that
the intervention be "without self-interest or expectation of national
political, economic or military gain."''1 A bit less stringently, it is
sometimes suggested that the "overriding" 25 motive must be one of
protecting human rights, or the most basic human rights, or that the"predominant",- motive be of such character. Alternatively, the motive
requirement may be formulated more concretely, if still vaguely, along
the lines that there be "no intention to change the political or legal
structure of the offending regime."'2
Ascertaining an actor's motive, particularly when the actor is a
state not subject to deposition under oath or mandatory
psychoanalysis, is discouragingly difficult. - The matter of state motive
122. See id.
123. See Sohn, Gradations of Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INTL & COMP.
L. 225 (1983).
124. De Schutter, supra note 53, at 29. See also id. at 36 (tainting effect of "political,
economic or military motives").
125. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 613; Behuniak, supra note 7, at 187; Fonteyne, supra
note 104, at 261.
126. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 602; Levitin, supra note 3, at 652 n.148.
127. D. FORSYTHE, HumAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS 28 (1983).
128. On the domestic legal analogue, see, e.g., Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB.
L. REV. 197 (1976).
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is typically so inherently nebulous that one should realistically expect
those states sympathetic or unsympathetic to an act of intervention to
characterize the intervening state's motives in ways consistent with
their own evaluation of the merits of the intervention itself. More
importantly, purely altruistic, self-sacrificing, disinterested motivation
is rare enough among persons, 129 and strikingly uncommon or easily
discouraged on the international scene. To insist on purity of motive
is, realistically, to essentially abolish the legal doctrine of humanitarian
intervention.
Most cases of humanitarian intervention, or of most voluntary acts
generally, are mixed motive cases. 130 In many of these, we may stipu-
late, the humanitarian motive is present to some degree, but is not
the overriding or predominant motive. Why this should lead to repudi-
ation of the intervention, without more, is unclear. Let us suppose
that the United States had militarily intervened in Europe in the
1930s to rescue any person who felt threatened by Hitler. Suppose
further that the predominant motive was not disinterested or altruistic,
but one based on the perceived national interest. It would seem frankly
preposterous to condemn the act, in virtue of its illicit motivation, as
wrong. In exchange for such favorable consequences as those achieved
in such a case, overlooking motives such as self-defense seems fully
justified.
The argument need not be left at the level of the hypothetical. As
one scholar has observed:
India's motives for unilateral intervention in East Bengal
were not pure: The Bangladesh crisis provided India with a
convenient opportunity to diminish the power and halve the
territory of its fiercest political and military rival. However,
many scholars, citing the mass slaughter of East Bengalis
by the West Pakistani army, have considered the Bangladesh
intervention to be a leading case of humanitarian interven-
tion. 131
Requiring that the intervenor's motive be predominantly altruistic
only makes sense if we have concluded that the otherwise unavoidable
cost of a broad humanitarian intervention rule in the contemporary
129. A leading contemporary philosopher suggests that while "[t]here is such a thing as
pure altruism," nevertheless "it may never occur in isolation from all other motives." T. NAGEL,
THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 80 (1970).
130. See R. VINCENT, supra note 1, at 12 ("any one case of intervention might combine
several purposes").
131. Bazyler, supra note 1, at 589.
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era outweighs the concerns that humanitarian intervention is under-
supplied from the standpoint of overall collective welfare. We have
seen little reason to accept this. To the extent that we wish to encour-
age plainly good outcomes, or right actions, the international legal
community may be better advised to rely on, and legitimize, the rela-
tively "durable" motives of self-interest, as opposed to the more
"fragile" or unstable motives of altruism.
This analysis does not change if the requisite motive is charac-
terized negatively, as in the suggestion that there must be "no inten-
tion to change the political or legal structure of the offending re-
gime."'132 Suppose that the change minimally sufficient to prevent
wholesale slaughter under the regime of a Pol Pot or an Idi Amin
does in fact involve a change, and an intent on the part of the inter-
venor to effect a change, in the political or legal structure of the
regime in question. The prevention of mass carnage should not be
prohibited even in some cases in which legal or political structural
changes are intended and effected. Again, this is not to ignore the
risks, but to suggest that they may be outweighed.
A final commonly proposed limitation on the legal doctrine of
humanitarian intervention is, at its most elaborate, to the effect that
such intervention be permitted only in the severest, or most serious
cases. 133 For example, where the most fundamental rights of substan-
tial numbers' 34 of people are being immediately 135 threatened, with a
substantial degree of certainty.136 The general problem associated with
these restrictions is that to the extent that they have "teeth," they
may well proscribe morally justifiable interventions without compen-
sating gains. However, to the extent that they are relatively unde-
manding, they redundantly enjoin what the intervening nation would
typically have the strongest incentive to do regardless.
Consider, for example, the requirement of certainty. If such a
requirement is interpreted in too demanding a fashion, beneficial inter-
ventions are ruled out. If a state is legally permitted to intervene in
order to save 10,000 lives certain to be lost, it is not obvious why a
132. D. FORSYTHE, supra note 127, at 28.
133. See, e.g., F. TESON, supra note 8, at 117; Hassan, supra note 29, at 895; Levitin,
supra note 3, at 652-53.
134. See, e.g., F. TESON, supra note 8, at 117; Bazyler, supra note 1, at 600; Hassan,
supra note 29, at 896.
135. See, e.g., Fonteyne, supra note 104, at 260; Sohn, supra note 123, at 230.
136. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 1, at 600 (standard of "clear evidence" of severe depri-
vations); Hassan, supra note 29, at 896 (forceful humanitarian intervention is probably inapprop-
riate 'if there is a reasonable prospect" of immediate cessation without such intervention).
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similar intervention to save 50,000 people who stand a one-fourth
chance of being killed should be impermissible. 137 While a figure of
25% will doubtless be speculative, the assumption that the deaths in
question are nearly certain to occur is also. If, on the other hand, the
certainty requirement is watered down, it becomes an international
legal requirement that the prospective intervenor not engage in con-
duct that it expects will be costly and probably pointless.
Other related requirements can be similarly characterized. It is
often suggested that to justify humanitarian intervention, the abuses
must be systematic, widespread, and pervasive, 138 or that the violations
be persistent.139 However, preventing a one-time mass execution of
the innocent may, on some appropriate theory, be morally justifiable.
Suppose that the Mahatma Gandhi, or his contemporary equivalent,
were threatened with death on a transparently false charge of sedition,
but that a "surgical" foreign military intervention could save his life
and work.14° Categorically ruling out humanitarian intervention on
grounds of lack of "widespreadness" seems insensitive to historical
realities and historical possibilities.
These problems may be avoided by revising the requirement so
that the intervention must target an abuse that can be said to "shock
the conscience.'1' Such a formulation may seem less rigid, but may
also seem either too narrow and extreme in focusing on only the most
horrifying abuses, or so subjective as to fail to supply a workable
component of a legal standard. The Supreme Court has on occasion
been able to either find ' 42 or not find' 43 that an alleged due process
137. Cf. the reference to a hypothetical 10% chance of persecution as establishing a "well-
founded fear of persecution" in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
138. See, e.g., F. TESON, supra note 8, at 117.
139. See E. STOWELL, supra note 6, at 53.
140. The notion of rescuing Gandhi from such a fate may be thought to carry a distracting
emotional appeal. Perhaps even a closer question would be whether intervention, whether called
"humanitarian" or not, could ever be morally justified to avoid the -certain destruction of com-
mercial property of immense value. The consensus seems to be in the negative. See Bazyler,
supra note 1, at 581; Farer, supra note 93, at 164. It is not clear why some sort of moral
proportionalism cannot be exercised, in at least clear and extreme commercial property cases,
without legitimizing some sort of reinvigorated nineteenth century imperialism.
141. See, e.g., Bond, supra note 4, at 61; Lillich, supra note 119, at 209. Cf. E. STOWELL,
supra note 6, at 139 (reference to "injustice and cruelty so excessive as to constitute an intolerable
abuse and to shock the opinion of other states").
142. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (police behavior as "conduct that
shocks the conscience").
143. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (the double jeopardy at issue held
not to constitute "a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it"), overruled,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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violation shocked the judicial conscience. Realistically, however, we
must anticipate that in otherwise controversial cases of humanitarian
intervention, whether the purported abuses "shocked the conscience"
of some appropriate person could be carried on interminably in a
sterile, virtually standardless fashion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Expanding the scope of legally justified humanitarian intervention
is not utterly devoid of risks. However, some risks are, given their
nature and magnitude, worth taking, in light of the value and proba-
bility of achieving not otherwise attainable valued ends. This article
has suggested that the current legal prohibition, or narrow cir-
cumscription, of the principle of humanitarian intervention is not well
grounded in moral or practical concerns. The otherwise avoidable un-
desirable consequences of the abuse of an expanded doctrine of
humanitarian intervention seem to be decreasing historically, and we
have seen several reasons to believe that the "supply" of humanitarian
intervention is currently substantially less than that which would
maximize collective welfare. If the arguments against a broader doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention are in fact either themselves morally
suspect or else losing their historic force, continued international legal
repudiation of humanitarian intervention may simply tend to bring
international law itself into disrepute among those concerned to do
right.

